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SIDE-LINING SUBSIDIARITY:  




The principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy that strives to allocate responsibility at the 
national level in order to bring decision-making closer to those affected by it. Legitimacy is not 
the only reason for allocating competence to the national level. In some cases, such as the UN 
Security Council’s (UNSC) schemes to prevent terrorist financing and the proliferation of 
chemical, biological and nuclear (CBN) weapons, responsibility is allocated for reasons of 
effectiveness. Treating these security threats as ‘weakest-link goods’,1 the UNSC has aimed to 
decentre the administration of collective security to nation-states so as to create a completely 
regulated inter-national sphere in which terrorists and proliferators are starved of means and 
opportunity to perpetrate attacks. In pursuit of this goal, the Council has sought to create shared 
frameworks for action by carving out a new ‘quasi-legislative’ power. In an attempt to quell 
criticism of this move, the Council reassured states that they would retain national control over 
the implementation of their obligations, thereby satisfying the principle of subsidiarity. In effect, 
however, subsidiarity has been side-lined by the Council’s strategy of implementation. This 
employs disciplinary power, as Michel Foucault called it, to generate an ‘infra-law’ at the level 
of technical detail and to ‘normalize’ states according to it. Discipline shares the Council’s logic 
of effectiveness and subsidiarity’s preference for national responsibility, but it operates below 
the surface of the formal law out and of the reach of subsidiarity. It offers a notion of national 
responsibility shorn of national control. 
 
The argument is made in three parts. Subsidiarity’s logic of legitimacy is briefly considered in 
Part II, which concentrates on the logic of effectiveness underlying the UNSC’s schemes. The 
disparity between the open-textured norms on the face of the UNSC’s quasi-legislative 
resolutions and the disciplinary work of its subsidiary bodies is the focus of Part III. The 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’s Recommendations on money laundering and terrorist 
financing are shown to constitute disciplinary infra-law of the legislative resolutions in Part IV, 
which also offers an illustration of discipline’s negative effect on national control. 
 
II Logics of effectiveness and legitimacy 
 
The principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy, while the Security Council’s approach to 
the prevention of terrorist financing and CBN proliferation has a logic of effectiveness. These 
logics are incompatible. The UNSC’s reasoning is totalizing: It treats the international realm as a 
bounded space which transnational threats cannot escape as they do the boundaries of nation-
states. If this bounded space can be controlled, then – the logic continues – it may be possible to 
                                                 
1 Below, at II(B)(1) 
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deprive terrorists and proliferators of the conditions they need to succeed, such as finance and 
support, man-power, open borders, lax import-export controls and corrupt or incompetent 
criminal justice systems. The Council has framed the problem of preventing these threats as a 
‘weakest link good’ that makes every gap, deficiency and malpractice a potential, however 
remote, impediment to achieving a totally regulated space and thereby preventing international 
terrorism and CBN proliferation. Achieving this in practice is no easy task. The Council cannot 
regulate the international realm on its own, as it is dependent on UN member states to carry out 
its own decisions.2 Given this set-up and the Council’s unrepresentative post-WWII composition, 
it has adopted a strategy of using UN member states as nodes in a decentralized scheme of 
administering the entire international (not global) space. Total regulation of aspects of this space 
is needed to deprive terrorists and proliferators of the means and opportunity of operating. The 
success of the schemes depend on the capacity of all states to control their borders, maintain an 
effective criminal justice system and institute adequate financial regulation. The Council’s logic 
of effectiveness demands the eradication of all weak-links and gaps in regulation.  
 
A. Legitimacy, effectiveness and subsidiarity 
 
The principle of subsidiarity strives to bring decision-making closer to those affected, but neither 
the principle of subsidiarity, nor its logic of legitimacy is absolute. The claim that low-level 
decision-making is not ipso facto more legitimate is considered below. The principle of 
subsidiarity, unlike the concept of sovereignty, is limited because it can be displaced by reasons 
of effectiveness.3 On this reading subsidiarity is a ‘rebuttable presumption in favour of the local’4 
that can be displaced by evidence that action at a higher level is more likely to be effective. This 
model of subsidiarity is to be found in the Treaty on European Union which holds that ‘the 
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States’5 because decisions should be taken ‘as closely as 
possible to the citizen’.6 The notion that the preference for the local can be overridden by 
considerations of effectiveness can also be found in the Roman Catholic principle of subsidiarity, 
 
‘Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own 
initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice…to assign to a 
greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do’.7  
 
                                                 
2 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Articles 25 and 48(1) 
3 Markus Jachtenfuchs and Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. ? 
(Vol 2, 2016), at 7 
4 Id. at 6 
5 European Union, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 
1992, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES C 325/5; 24 December 2002, Article 5(3) 
6 Treaty on European Union, Article 1,  
7 Pope Pius XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), para 46, quoted in Nicholas Barber, The Limited Modesty of 
Subsidiarity 11 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 308 (vol. 3, 2005) at 310 
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Like EU subsidiarity, the Catholic version premises the preference for the local on the capacity 
of these entities to accomplish given objectives. As pointed out by the editors, the most 
contentious issue is often where the threshold lies for displacing the preference for the local.8 
 
For certain collective action problems, the threshold is fairly low. This is usually the case where 
collective security is concerned; arguments based on the importance of autonomy in decision-
making and national diversity lack bite against arguments that coordinated action is required to 
tackle a common existential threat. The UN Charter reflects this sort of thinking because of the 
unprecedentedly potent tools with which the Council is equipped and the board discretion it has 
to interpret and deploy them.9 Exceptionally, it was empowered to decide to ‘take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security’ as well as ‘measures not involving the use of armed force’ in order ‘to give effect to its 
decisions’.10 As the formulation in Article 24(1) affirms, the Council was built on a principle of 
effectiveness and member states conferred on the Council its ‘primary responsibility’ for 
international peace and security ‘in order to ensure prompt and effective action’.11 Effectiveness 
concerns squeeze out legitimacy concerns and the principle of non-intervention ‘in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’, which was designed to protect 
members’ sovereign,12 is expressly made subject to Chapter VII.  
 
The UNSC’s inclination for effectiveness over legitimacy is all the more striking action given its 
notorious legitimacy deficit. The Council is neither representative nor accountable.13 
Koskenniemi summed up the problem, 
 
‘The dominant role of the permanent five [P5], the secrecy of the Council's procedures, the 
lack of a clearly delimited competence and the absence of what might be called a legal 
culture within the Council hardly justify enthusiasm about its increased role in world 
affairs’.14 
 
All states recognized this in 2005 when heads of state agreed that the UNSC must become ‘more 
broadly representative, efficient and transparent’.15 A particular issue has been the five 
permanent members’ privileged position in the Council. They can effectively veto attempts to 
                                                 
8 Jachtenfuchs and Krisch, supra note 3, at 7 
9 Nico Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework (1237-1271), at 1243 in Bruno Simma et al 
(eds) THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 3rd ed. (2012) 
10 UN Charter, Articles 42 and 41 
11 UN Charter, Article 24(1) 
12 Georg Nolte, Article 2(7) (280-311) at 283 in Bruno Simma et al (eds) THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 3rd ed. (2012) 
13 But cf Frederic L. Kirgis, The Security Council’s First Fifty Years 89 AJIL 506 (July, 1995), at 520-528 
14 Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN; A Dialectical View 6 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 325 (vol 3, 1995) at 327 
15 World Summit Outcome, GA Res. 60/1, para. 79 (Sept. 16, 2005), para. 153 
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interfere with their own jurisdictional autonomy,16 while simultaneously exerting enormous 
influence over Chapter VII decisions that affect states’ control over their domestic spheres.17 
This institutional imbalance was the result of a bargain struck when the Charter was drafted in 
which the great powers of 1945 agreed to guarantee international peace and security in return for 
institutional privileges.18 The Charter allows the permanent members to use their collective 
might for the collective security of everyone in situations that threaten international peace and 
security.19 In situations falling short of this threshold, the Council’s powers to deprive states of 
national control is much more limited. For example, the consent of the parties is one of the core 
principles of UN peacekeeping,20 and although member states are obliged to settle their disputes 
by peaceful means,21 the Council can do no more than make ‘recommendations’ to the parties so 
long as the dispute does not constitute a threat to international peace and security.22 The 
existence of Article 39 as a limit between national control and Council intervention, albeit a very 
fluid and indeterminate limit,23 reflects the underlying importance of legitimacy to the 
effectiveness of Council action by circumscribing the conditions in which the logic of 
effectiveness can completely displace the logic of legitimacy.24  
 
B. Weakest-link goods and transnational security challenges 
 
The simple equation described above in which the determination of an Article 39 situation 
simultaneously decides the question of where responsibility for collective security should lie and, 
by extension, whether priority is given to effectiveness or legitimacy, does not always work. This 
is especially evident where transnational threats to collective security, like international 
terrorism, are concerned because they are seen as posing a challenge that cannot be resolved by 
coercive enforcement alone. As well as taking relatively targeted measures in respect of material 
threats, such as the imposition of sanctions against individuals associated with al-Qaeda,25 the 
Council has recently extended its toolkit to include measures designed to prevent international 
terrorism – particularly nuclear terrorism – from materializing at all. In order to do this, the 
Council has used so-called ‘legislative’26 resolutions to lay down obligations on states to prevent 
                                                 
16 UN Charter, Article 27(3) 
17 See e.g. Kishore Mahbubani, The Permanent and Elected Council Members, 253-266 in D.M. Malone (ed.), THE 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY (2004) 
18 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004), at para. 77 
19 UN Charter, Article 39 
20 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: 
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES (2008), at 31 
21 UN Charter, Article 2(3) 
22 UN Charter, Article 38 
23 Nico Krisch, Article 39 (1272-1296), at 1274 in Bruno Simma et al (eds) THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 3rd ed. (2012) 
24 A More Secure World, supra note 18, at 66, para. 204 
25 UN Doc. S/Res/1267 (15 October 1999) 
26 Matthew Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations 16 LEIDEN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 593 (2003); Paul Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating 96 AJIL 
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and suppress the financing and support of terrorism,27 and to counter the proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.28  
 
This move flummoxes the association of Chapter VII with centralized, top-down action because 
it uses Chapter VII to institute a decentralized, bottom-up approach to collective security in 
which each UN member state is a link in an unbroken chain of counter-terrorism. This strategy 
conceives of the prevention of transnational threats to collective security as a ‘weakest-link’ 
global public good in which each state.29 The logic of allocating responsibility to nation-states is 
not purely a matter of legitimacy. It is primarily driven by a scheme for administrative 
decentralization and has a logic of effectiveness. The coincidence of these two logics masks the 
way that national responsibility, while it creates the impression of doing so, does not guarantee 
national control and, moreover, may actively diminish states’ control over the implementation of 
their obligations. This sets up the main argument of the article made in Parts III and IV; that 
disciplinary ‘infra-law’, which shares the logic of effectiveness with administrative 
decentralization, is used to control states’ implementation efforts on a sub-legal level, effectively 
side-lining subsidiarity. 
 
1. Weakest-link goods 
 
Subsidiarity is vulnerable to being side-lined where strategies aimed at securing weakest link 
public goods involve administrative decentralization, as is the case in the UN collective security 
system. In these cases, subsidiarity’s logic of legitimacy and the logic of effectiveness that 
underwrites administrative decentralization overlap, potentially leading to a situation where 
national institutions have responsibility but lack control. At the global level, administrative 
decentralization of responsibility from the UN to nation-states seems to be the most practicable 
way of attaining weakest-link goods because the central UN institutions are under-resourced and 
UN member-states jealously guard their sovereignty. UN institutions tend to outsource the 
realization of their decisions to states and, beyond the scope of the present study, to other global 
actors. Scott Barrett explained that ‘some global public goods can only be supplied if every 
country lends a hand. Should even one country not help, the entire effort may fail’.30 Illustrating 
the concept using the eradication of smallpox in 1979, he wrote, ‘if even one country had not 
eliminated smallpox, the entire effort would have failed’.31 The UN has adopted similar 
                                                                                                                                                             
901 (vol 4, 2002); Luis Miguel Hinojosa-Martínez, The Legislative Role of the Security Council in its Fight Against 
Terrorism: Legal, Political and Practical Limits 57 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
QUARTERLY 333 (vol 2, 2008); Eric Rosand, The Security Council as ‘Global Legislator’: Ultra Vires or Ultra 
Innovative? 28 FORDHAM ILJ 542 (2004-2005)  
27 UN Doc. S/Res/1373 (28 September 2001) 
28 UN Doc. S/Res/1540 (28 April 2004) 
29 Scott Barrett, WHY COOPERATE: THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS (2007), at 4 
30 Id. at 47 
31 Id. at 4 
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reasoning to prevent terrorism. The UN Secretary General’s report Uniting Against Terrorism 
emphasized that, 
 
‘Terrorists exploit weaknesses in both developing and developed States to fund, organize, 
equip and train their recruits, carry out their attacks, and hide from arrest. Building 
capacity in all States must therefore be the cornerstone of the global counter-terrorism 
effort’.32 
 
This analysis became ‘a core element of the global counter-terrorism effort’ in the UN’s Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy.33 From this perspective, the project of preventing terrorism is 
imperilled by the existence of a single state with porous borders through which CBN matériel 
might pass into the hands of terrorists; the existence of a state which does not or cannot regulate 
financial transactions to prevent funds from reaching terrorists; the existence of a single port 
authority which lacks the capacity to monitor and control the containers which pass through. 
This diagnosis brings international terrorism among the ‘threats without boundaries’ that 
received top billing in the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change (HLP)’s report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.34  
 
The logic of the UN’s approach to terrorism is further elucidated by the way transnational threats 
and challenges are conceptualized: As they are not neatly bounded within a single state or region, 
‘a threat to one is a threat to all’.35 It follows that all states must take part in the solution of such 
problems because ‘where weakest-link goods are concerned, a universal approach will usually be 
necessary for effective action’.36 In a ministerial-level statement the UNSC affirmed that ‘the 
active participation and collaboration of all’ member states is essential to combatting terrorism.37 
In short, weakest-link global public goods seem to demand universal effort solutions that 
presuppose a bounded space that can be totally controlled. There is no room for gaps and 
‘whether the supply of the weakest-link global public goods succeeds or fails depends on the 
country that does the least’.38 It is not enough for the most well-resourced and capable states to 
level their best efforts at the problem, or even for the majority of states to cooperate to solve the 
problem; the participation of every state becomes crucial to the success of the project.  
 
A second feature of this strategy of prevention is that universal participation alone is not enough; 
it must be the right sort of participation. If the international space is to be completely regulated 
                                                 
32 Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy: Report of the Secretary 
General, 27 April 2006, A/60/825, at 74, at 15, para. 74 
33 UN Doc. A/Res/60/288 (8 September 2006), Plan of Action, point III 
34 A More Secure World, supra note 18, paras 17-23 
35 Id. at para. 17 
36 Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods 108 AJIL 1 (vol 1, 
2014) at 9 
37 UN Doc. S/Res/1377 (12 November 2001) 
38 Barrett, supra note 29, at 72 
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so as to prevent terrorism, then individual participants’ efforts must, at a minimum, avoid being 
counter-productive and, preferably, aim for synergy. The UN’s desire for such a coordinated 
response is evident from its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which the General Assembly 
described as ‘a strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses, at the 
national, regional and international levels, to counter terrorism’.39 The UNSC’s quasi-legislative 
resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004), the focus of this article, express this using the same 
formula of ‘recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, 
regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response’. These resolutions are 
meant to promote both universal participation of UN member states,40 and a coordinated 
response by positing its bare bones requirements, and in so doing, amount to a decentralization 
of administration. 
 
The administrative decentralization that the Council pursues with its approach to prevention has 
a logic of effectiveness which seems prima facie incompatible with subsidiarity to the extent that 
national authorities are unequal to carrying out their responsibilities. Conceptualization of the 
problem in terms of weakest-links means that incapacitous and incompetent states cannot be left 
out of the universal effort solution, and must be transformed if the international space is to be 
completely regulated. As we shall see, however, the UNSC has effectuated this transformation 
whilst simultaneously invoking the principle of subsidiarity.   
 
2. Transforming incapacitous states 
 
While the UNSC’s prevention strategy centres on its quasi-legislative resolutions, positive 
international legal norms alone cannot address the problem of states that are unable or unwilling 
to carry out their obligations. If a state were to be avowedly unwilling to shoulder its 
responsibilities and transform its domestic sphere, it is possible that Chapter VII measures could 
be taken to enforce its decision.41 The Council has acknowledged that such a solution would be 
unsuitable for the more numerous group of states that are merely unable to implement the 
resolutions. It recognized ‘that some States may require assistance in implementing the 
provisions’ because they lack ‘the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience 
and/or resources for fulfilling the’ provisions.42 The emphasis on assistance rather than 
enforcement seems to have been a response to the wider membership’s fears that the UNSC was 
attempting to act as a world government in passing quasi-legislation.43 Council members seemed 
to accept that an iron-fisted approach to implementation was incompatible with their goal of 
                                                 
39 UN Doc. A/Res/60/288 (8 September 2006) echoing the language of the World Summit Outcome document, at 
para. 82 
40 UN Charter, Articles 25 and 48(1) 
41 Isobel Roele, The Strategic Landscape on the Underside of Law in Tanja Aalberts and Thomas Gammeltoft-
Hansen (eds) TITLE TBC, forthcoming 
42 UN Doc. S/Res/1540 (2004), op. 7. A similar statement on terrorist financing was made in resolution 1377 (2001). 
43 Below, at [‘Open-textured’ III(a)] 
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securing states’ active involvement and avoiding grudging participation and resistance.44 This 
attitude accords with an insight of Foucault, who thought that ‘if you are too violent, you risk 
provoking revolts’.45 Foucault studied the forms of power that replaced this sort of repressive 
enforcement of the sovereign will. He gave the label ‘disciplinary power’ to the first distinct 
genre of these power relations that he identified.46   
 
The Council’s approach to implementing its quasi-legislative resolutions bears a striking 
resemblance to the apparatuses Foucault examined in Discipline and Punish. Disciplinary power 
has various hallmarks that are identifiable in UNSC strategies to promote implementation. In 
particular, the disciplinary logic of treating individuals as components within a machine 
resonates with the Council’s desire for a universal effort solution to prevent terrorism. 
Individuals become effective components of disciplinary institutions through a process of 
‘normalization’47 based on  ‘an optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result’.48 
The instrumental value of building this optimal capacity in individuals is manifested in the 
increased efficacy of the common efforts in which they are engaged. In Foucault’s words 
discipline operates by ‘composing forces in order to obtain an efficient machine’.49 In this way, it 
shares the logic of effectiveness of administrative decentralization and ‘allows both the 
characterization of the individual as individual and the ordering of a given multiplicity. It is the 
first condition for the control and use of an ensemble of distinct elements’.50  
 
As discipline brings distinct elements into a coherent whole, it becomes totalizing: ‘The first 
action of discipline is in fact to circumscribe a space in which its power and the mechanisms of 
its power will function fully and without limit’.51 In the Council’s approach to implementation, 
this is manifest in its focus on eradicating gaps and remedying deficiencies and in the logical 
requirement of creating entirely regulated space in order to prevent terrorism. Furthermore, 
discipline achieves such momentous transformations by carefully avoiding controversy. It 
employs ‘minute technical inventions’52 that Foucault described as ‘the other, dark side’ of the 
formal legal framework. They work by ‘extend[ing] the general forms defined by law to the 
infinitesimal level’ and ‘enabl[ing] individuals to become integrated into [the] general demands’ 
of the law.53 As we shall see, this supplies a useful description of the mechanisms developed to 
assist states in the implementation of the quasi-legislative resolutions. Disciplinary power 
relations can help to bring about the decentralized administration, but it will become clear that it 
                                                 
44 Roele, The Strategic Landscape, supra note 41, at ? 
45 Michel Foucault, The Eye of Power in C. Gordon (ed.) POWER/KNOWLEDGE (1980), at 155 
46 Michel Foucault, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (trans. Alan Sheridan) (1995) 
47 Michel Foucault, SECURITY, TERRITORY AND POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE 
FRANCE 1977-1978 (trans. Graham Burchell) (2009) at 56 
48 Id. at 57 
49 Foucault, supra note 46, at 164 
50 Id. at 149 
51 Foucault, supra note 47, at 44-45 
52 Foucault, supra note 46, at 220 
53 Id. at 222 
May 2015 Forthcoming Law and Contemporary Problems Isobel Roele 
9 
 
is not at all compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. In order to achieve its objective of 
normalizing individual states, discipline side-lines subsidiarity.  
 
III Quasi-Legislation and Infra-Law 
 
As we have seen, the UNSC treats terrorism prevention as a weakest-link good that requires a 
universal effort solution that cannot tolerate incapacity or incompetence. Discipline provides a 
useful way of remedying weak links without appearing to coerce. Its function is to root out 
inadequacy and to normalize individuals so they become useful components of a given 
apparatus. In effect, the subsidiary bodies that the UNSC created to oversee implementation of 
the quasi-legislation, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the 1540 Committee, have 
developed an approach to assisting states that amounts to disciplinary normalization.54 A former 
chairman of the CTC explained that; 
 
‘Our aim is to raise the average level of Government performance against terrorism around 
the globe. This means upgrading the capacity of each nation’s legislation and executive 
machinery to fight terrorism. Every government holds a responsibility for ensuring that 
there is no weak part of the chain’.55 
 
This statement places the responsibility for implementation firmly on the shoulders of on nation-
states, a move that echoes disciplinary power’s scrupulous parsimony.56 The logic of 
effectiveness implied by the motive of administrative decentralization provides that 
responsibility tends to intensify rather than relax discipline’s ability to control individuals’  
actions. Conversely, the logic of legitimacy underlying the principle of subsidiarity suggests that 
national responsibility connotes national control. The nature of discipline as ‘infra law’ enables 
this doublethink by side-lining subsidiarity, which remains applicable at the level of formal law 
in order to still states’ fears that the Council was trying to impinge on their jurisdictional 
autonomy. 
 
A. Open-textured quasi-legislation 
 
The principle of subsidiarity has been implicated in the justification and criticism of UNSC 
quasi-legislation. This is easiest to see in the context of resolution 1540 (2004) which imposed 
obligations on all states to prevent CBN materiel and its means of delivery from falling into the 
hands of terrorists. This resolution did not benefit from the wave of sympathy following 9/11 on 
                                                 
54 Isobel Roele, Disciplinary Power in the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee 19 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND 
SECURITY LAW 49 (vol 1, 2014) 
55 UN Doc. S/PV.4453 (2002), at 4 
56 Foucault, supra note 46, at 218 
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which resolution 1373 on terrorist financing was passed.57 Many states vociferously opposed the 
Council’s quasi-legislative practice as an unwonted infraction of their jurisdictional autonomy 
and a disruption of the balance of competences between the Council and the General 
Assembly.58 There were also fears that the obligations could be coercively imposed on states that 
were unduly creative or tardy in implementing them.59 Much of the opposition was phrased in 
terms of states’ national control and the primacy of domestic responsibility for many of the 
issues under discussion.60 These objections make the same species of legitimacy claim made by 
the principle of subsidiarity because they assume domestic decision-making is more legitimate 
than centralized Council decision-making. Proponents of the resolution were compelled to 
acknowledge the force of these concerns, but not because they shared the logic of legitimacy that 
underlay them. Instead, they were moved by a logic of effectiveness that requires the cooperation 
of all UN members with the quasi-legislation and must therefore address their concerns in order 
to ‘increase its acceptance and thereby contribute to its full and global implementation’.61 The 
logics of effectiveness and legitimacy support the same result of national responsibility for 
implementation. The problem is that far from ensuring national control, the principle of 
subsidiarity helps to diminish it by providing façade legitimation.  
 
Statements given in support of the resolution by its sponsors include justifications from both 
effectiveness and legitimacy. As to the former, for instance, the Russian representative explained 
that a UNSC resolution was necessary ‘to ensure the coordination of action’ and to establish ‘an 
operational framework for international cooperation’.62 The US representative was in agreement, 
adding that ‘it is essential that all States — not just States parties to a specific treaty or supplier 
regime — maintain adequate controls over their nuclear material, equipment and expertise’.63 
Others justified the Council’s involvement by down-playing its enforcement capability and 
stressing its unique ability to propound universally binding norms.64 As to legitimacy, the 
sponsors reassured the UN membership that although standards were to be set at the international 
level, it would be for each state to decide on how implementation would take effect. For 
instance, the Spanish representative stressed that ‘the draft resolution is not intrusive — because 
it gives States leeway on how to internally interpret its implementation’.65 Similarly, the French 
                                                 
57 Ian  Johnstone, The Security Council as Legislature 80, in B. Cronin and I. Hurd (eds) THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY (2008), at 90 
58 Non-Aligned Movement, UN Doc. S/PV.5635 (2007), at 29; India, UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (22 April 2004), at 23; 
Namibia, UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (Resumption 1) (22 April 2004), at 17 
59 For the NAM statement, see; UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (Resumption 1) (22 April 2004), at 4 
60 See e.g. India (UN Doc. S/PV.6518 (20 April 2011), at 3-4); Norway (UN Doc. S/PV.5635 (Resumption 1) (23 
February 2007), at 2); Brazil (UN Doc. S/PV.5635 (Resumption 1) (23 February 2007), at 14); South Africa (UN 
Doc. S/PV.7169 (7 May 2014), at 27) 
61 UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (22 April 2004), at 18 
62 UN Doc. S/PV.4956 (28 April 2004), at 6 (RF) 
63 UN Doc. S/PV.4956 (28 April 2004), at 5 
64 UK, UN Doc. S/PV.4956 (28 April 2004), at 7; Spain, UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (22 April 2004), at 7; France, UN 
Doc. S/PV.4950 (22 April 2004), at 8-9 
65 UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (22 April 2004), at 7 
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representative promised that ‘the Council is establishing the goals, but it leaves each State free to 
define the penalties, legal regulations and practical measures to be adopted’.66 These are fairly 
clear promises of national control. 
 
The promises seemed to be borne out by the open-textured language of resolution 1540. States’ 
obligations are contained in the first three operative paragraphs: the first decides they shall 
refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, 
manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use’ CBN weapons and their means of delivery; the 
second decides they shall ‘adopt and enforce effective laws which prohibit’ non-state actors from 
doing these things; and the third paragraph decides that ‘all States shall take and enforce 
effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent’ CBN proliferation. Operative 
paragraph three gives a little more detail about what sorts of controls are intended in four sub-
paragraphs which require states to develop measures to account for and secure relevant materials, 
to develop physical protection measures, to develop border security and law enforcement 
capacity to counter the trafficking of relevant materials and to develop national export and trans-
shipment controls. None of these prescriptions is fleshed out in the text of resolution 1540 which 
only specifies that the measures taken be ‘effective’. This factor was material to many states’ 
support for the resolution. For instance, Pakistan stated that its concerns that the Council was 
attempting to ‘assume the stewardship of global non-proliferation and disarmament issues’ were 
allayed because 1540 ‘does not seek to prescribe specific legislation, which is left to national 
action by States’.67 
 
Resolution 1373 is also open-textured. The three pertinent paragraphs of 1373 are only slightly 
more detailed than those of 1540. The first obliges states to prevent and suppress the financing of 
terrorist acts; to criminalize the provision or collection of funds for terrorist activities; to freeze 
the funds of those who commit or participate in terrorist activities; and to prohibit those over 
whom they have jurisdiction from making funds or other services available to terrorists directly 
or indirectly. The second paragraph lists seven obligations for states to refrain from providing 
active or passive support to terrorists; to prevent the commission of terrorist acts; to deny safe 
haven to supporters of terrorism; to prevent terrorists using their territories to launch attacks 
against other states; to ensure that those involved in terrorist activities are brought to justice; to 
cooperate with other states in criminal investigations and proceedings against terrorists; and to 
take effective border control measures to prevent the movement of terrorists. The third paragraph 
is not binding, but exhorts states to take measures to grease the wheels of cooperation and to 
respect various international law norms including those relating to human rights and refugee law.  
 
On their face, the provisions of the quasi-legislative resolutions leave states broad interpretive 
discretion even though positive action is required to implement them. This impression has led 
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Tsagourias to suggest that the resolutions are commensurate with the principle of subsidiarity 
because they respect states’ jurisdictional autonomy and strike a proportionate balance between 
central standard-setting and local implementation: 
 
‘states retain a meaningful degree of jurisdictional authority because they enjoy flexibility 
in the way they implement the SC legislation and participate thus in the law-making 
process together with the Security Council, without, however, deviating from the common 
goal’.68 
 
The principle of subsidiarity, then, has increased the legitimacy of the UNSC’s controversial 
quasi-legislative practices in the minds of academics as well as states. Formally speaking, states 
have control over the way they implement their obligations because of the open-textured nature 




A different picture emerges if we look beneath the surface of the resolutions at the techniques 
and mechanisms that have been developed to assist states with their implementation efforts. 
These supportive initiatives do not belong to the world of formal law, but to what Foucault called 
‘infra law’.69 Typically, they rely on expert technical knowledge to rescale the broad obligations 
addressed to UN member states for the operational level of border guards, police units and 
financial regulators. These technical efforts to enhance and support states’ implementation 
efforts are disciplinary in nature. They suggest what Foucault called a ‘code of normalization’ 
rather than a code of law; a jurisprudence of ‘clinical knowledge’.70 They condition ‘the 
underside of law’, complementing the hard formal law of the resolutions by seeming ‘to 
constitute the same type of law on a different scale, thereby making it more meticulous’.71 This 
helps to square the UNSC’s allocation of competence to the national level in the light of the 
suggestion that ‘the supply of subsidiarity will be higher in regimes dealing with issues without 
international repercussions’.72 Just as one might expect with weakest-link goods as important as 
the prevention of CBN proliferation and international terrorism, the jurisdictional autonomy of 
states is more limited than it first appears.  
 
Effectively realizing the Council’s scheme of administrative decentralization has required many 
states to take positive measures to comply with the quasi-legislative resolutions, and a large 
proportion of them have needed technical and financial assistance in order to do so. The UNSC 
                                                 
68 Nicholas Tsagourias, Security Council Legislation, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and the Principle of 
Subsidiarity 24(3) LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 539 (vol 3, 2011), at 555 
69 Supra, section II(B)(2) 
70 Michel Foucault, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE 1975-76, 
(David Macey trans.) (2003), at 38 
71 Foucault, supra note 46, at 222 
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accepted this early on after the passage of resolution 1373,73 and resolution 1540 expressly 
recognized that many states would require implementation assistance.74 The Council’s strategy 
for achieving implementation eschews the coercive enforcement of legal norms and replaces it 
with technical norms and learning processes coordinated by its subsidiary bodies, the CTC and 
1540 Committee. Initially, these bodies were charged with monitoring states’ implementation to 
identify any weak links and gaps in implementation. Later they were given a broader mandate to 
assist states’ implementation efforts. Resolution 1977 encouraged ‘all States to prepare on a 
voluntary basis national implementation action plans, with the assistance of the 1540 Committee 
as appropriate, mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of 
resolution 1540’.75 Similarly, the CTC has been asked by the UNSC to help states and regional 
organization draft counter-terrorism strategies to further the implementation of 1373.76 The two 
functions of monitoring and assistance are complementary; the identification of weak links leads 
to assistance and not punishment. The sub-committees share an ‘essentially corrective’77 
approach characteristic of disciplinary power, that uses surveillance to seek out and reverses in 
states’ implementation efforts and correction to remedy them so that are ‘normalized’ into being 
effective components of the Council’s universal effort solution.  
 
The sub-committees take on very little of this work themselves.78 They outsource the provision 
of technical assistance to myriad expert and technical agencies within and outside the UN family, 
including the FATF to which we shall return. The 1540 Committee was asked to ‘liaise on the 
availability of programmes which might facilitate the implementation of resolution’,79 instead of 
passively requesting information from other organizations and states.80 The CTC’s instruction 
was to ‘facilitate technical assistance, specifically by promoting engagement between providers 
of capacity-building assistance and recipient’.81 In carrying out their mandates, the committees 
act as conduits between the formal legal norms contained in the UNSC resolutions and technical 
infra-law produced in the form of best practices, training manuals, legislative models and other 
forms of expert guidance.  
 
Just as discipline operates on the basis of an optimal model,82 so the committees compose 
implementation ideals by singling out certain norms and institutions as technically authoritative. 
This work has been undertaken pursuant to UNSC mandates to ‘explore with States and 
                                                 
73 UN Doc. S/Res/1377 (12 November 2001) 
74 UN Doc. S/Res/1540, op. 7 
75 UN Doc. S/Res/1977 (20 April 2011), op 8 
76 UN Doc. S/Res/2129 (17 December 2013), op. 7 
77 Foucault, supra note 46, at 179 
78 For a study of disciplinary power in the work of the CTC, see Isobel Roele, Disciplinary Power in the UN 
Counter-Terrorism Committee 19 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 49 (vol 1, 2014)  
79 UN Doc. S/Res/1977 (20 April 2011), op 10 
80 UN Doc. S/Res/1810 (25 April 2008) 
81 UN Doc. S/Res/2129 (17 December 2013), op. 7 
82 Supra, at III(B) 
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international, regional and sub-regional organizations experience-sharing and lessons learned’83 
and in 2008 the Council decided that the Committee should undertake such work.84 In 2011, this 
was taken further when the 1540 Committee was provided with a Group of Experts and charged 
with the task of ‘identify[ing] effective practices, templates and guidance, with a view to 
develop[ing] a compilation, as well as to consider preparing a technical reference guide about 
resolution 1540 (2004), to be used by States on a voluntary basis’.85 The CTC’s process of 
refining the provisions of 1373 is more sophisticated as it has had longer to respond to the 
Council’s requests that it ‘bear in mind all international best-practices, codes and standards’86 
and compile a directory of them.87 In response, the CTC has produced a strikingly 
comprehensive and detailed Directory of International Best Practices, Codes and Standards,88 
and a Technical Guide to Implementation structured around the first three operative paragraphs 
of resolution 1373.89 Notably, this Technical Guide forms the basis of the CTC’s detailed 
implementation surveys that monitor states’ implementation of their 1373 obligations. 
 
The loose coordinating, curating and orchestrating roles of the CTC and 1540 Committee are 
commensurate with discipline’s nature as a form of capillary power. Discipline is most easily 
understood by honing in on one of the myriad capillaries through which it flows. The final 
section of this article traces disciplinary power into the work of the FATF, which plays a role in 
the implementation of both quasi-legislative resolutions. The case study reveals how the apparent 
jurisdictional autonomy afforded to states in these resolutions is effectively displaced by 
technical prescriptions. This is made possible by the paralleling of the logics of effectiveness and 
legitimacy. The disciplinary interventions on the underside of the law, which share the logic of 
effectiveness of the UNSC’s project of administrative decentralization, are obscured by the 
principle of subsidiarity at the level of the formal legal norm. For all its persistence at this formal 
level, subsidiarity has no traction in the non-formal realm of infra-law, and discipline effectively 
side-lines it. 
 
IV Case Study: The Financial Action Task Force 
 
The FATF is an inter-governmental body established by the G7 in 1989. Today, its membership 
has expanded to 34 states, the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Its 
initial focus was anti-money laundering (AML) and in 1990 it produced 40 Recommendations to 
tackle it. In 2001 its remit was expanded to include countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) 
and it published an additional Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. The ‘40+9 
                                                 
83 UN Doc. S/Res/1673 (27 April 2006), op. 5(b) 
84 UN Doc. S/Res/1810 (25 April 2008), op. 11(d) 
85 UN Doc. S/Res/1977 (20 April 2011), op. 12 
86 UN Doc. S/Res/1456 (20 January 2003), op. para. 4(iii) 
87 UN Doc. S/Res/1566 (8 October 2004), op para. 7 
88 Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/bptable.html  
89 Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, Technical Guide to the Implementation of Resolution 1373 (2009) at 
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Recommendations’90 are regularly updated and are supported by well-developed disciplinary 
mechanisms, practices, techniques and tactics. Despite the FATF’s narrow membership, its 
Recommendations are intended to have universal effect. Rather than expand its own membership 
in order to achieve this, over 180 states belong to eight FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs)91 
which monitor and assist states’ implementation of the Recommendations. Remarkably, the 
FATF also holds states that are neither FATF nor FSRB members to its Recommendations. Its 
stated mission is to ‘identify national-level vulnerabilities’ and, to this end, to identify and 
engage ‘with high-risk, non-co-operative jurisdictions and those with strategic deficiencies in 
their national regimes’ which pose a threat to the financial system’s integrity.92 The FATF shares 
the UNSC’s totalizing logic of effectiveness that tolerates no weak-links, so it is perhaps no 
surprise that its technical Recommendations form part of the infra-law of 1373 and 1540. This 
has occurred through their incorporation as best practices by the Council’s subsidiary bodies. 
They feature heavily in the CTC’s Directory and Technical Guide to the Implementation of 
Resolution 1373.93 The FATF has also been expressly endorsed by the UNSC, which encouraged 
the CTC to ‘work closely with the FATF, including in the FATF’s mutual evaluations process’.94 
Since 2007 it has also been active in the area of the financing of CBN proliferation and in 2013 it 
published guidance on the implementation of resolution 1540.95 The FATF’s work in this area 
has been noted by the UNSC96 and the body has been invited brief the sub-committees on 
financing issues,97 but none of the UNSC resolutions contain a decision that makes its 
Recommendations formally binding on all states.  
 
The FATF works on the underside of 1540 and 1373 to ensure that all states have the capacity to 
play their part in protecting ‘the integrity of the international financial system’.98 Its practices are 
characteristically disciplinary, employing prescription, monitoring and correction to ‘normalize’ 
states. Apart from publishing and disseminating the Recommendations, it produces an abundance 
of technical guidance for their implementation. In order to see that they are implemented, it uses 
                                                 
90 The Financial Action Task Force Recommendations: International standards on combating money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism & proliferation (Paris, February 2012) at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf 
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Europe), the Eurasian Group; the Eastern and Southern Africa AML Group; the Inter-Governmental Action Group 
of West Africa; the Middle East and North Africa FATF; and the FATF of Latin America. There are currently plans 
for a ninth FSRB to cover Central Africa; GABAC. 
92 Financial Action Task Force Mandate 2012-2020 (20 April 2012) at http://www.fatf-
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93 Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, supra note 89 
94 UN Doc. S/Res/2129 (17 December 2013), op. 17 
95 FATF, The Implementation of Financial Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions to Counter 
the Proliferation of WMD (June 2013), at http://www.fatf-
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repeated mutual evaluation reviews (MERs) which subject states to constant supervision. Finally, 
its uses both carrot and stick to correct any deficiencies it finds by ranking states according to the 
progress they have made. The cumulative effect of these processes is to radically diminish 
national control over the implementation of their obligations, while constantly reasserting 




Foucault explained how disciplinary power focuses on the ‘control of activity’99 through the 
‘elaboration of the act’.100 Discipline is not satisfied with the open-textured UNSC resolutions 
because national control over their interpretation is inimical to normalization according to an 
optimal model. The model serves ‘as a common standard, a basic principle of comparison’101 and 
is constructed from micro-prescriptions that leave little room for interpretation. The FATF shares 
this logic: It seeks to homogenize states’ AML and CFT measures and ‘closing down regulatory 
arbitrage is essentially what the FATF is all about’, so as to prevent actors from exploiting 
disparities in regulatory standards between jurisdictions by eliminating difference.102 This is 
achieved by breaking down the legal norms into micro-prescriptions through multiple tiers of 
increasingly detailed prescriptions.  
 
The first tier of infra-law is formed by the Recommendations themselves which, since there are 
49 of them, already significantly disambiguate the sub-paragraphs of the quasi-legislative 
resolutions to which they are relevant. The next tier is made up of technical guidance for 
implementing the Recommendations, which is itself broken down into several strata. The first 
stratum comprises ‘interpretive notes’ to each recommendation which form part of the FATF 
standards and are intended to be mandatory except where they use examples that are intended to 
give guidance only.103 The second stratum comprises detailed Guidance and Best Practices 
papers published on specific recommendations, such as the guidance on transparency and 
beneficial ownership which corresponds to recommendations 24 and 25,104 as well as on cross-
cutting issues, such as the recent rise in prepaid cards, mobile payments and internet-based 
payment services.105 The third stratum is constituted by Typology Reports in the form of 
research papers on highly specific issues such as the relevance of the diamond trade to AML and 
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CFT,106 or of the trafficking of Afghan opiates.107 None of these documents has binding force as 
formal law; they are published as technical assistance. Nevertheless, they produce a densely-
textured optimal model for implementation which reduces national control of implementation. 
 
States’ loss of control over interpretation is compounded because most of them have little input 
into FATF’s processes of norm-creation: Not only are many of the norms classed as technical 
rather than political, states’ input is also limited because of the FATF’s ‘club-like’ 
composition.108  Less than one fifth of UN member states are members of the FATF, which has a 
reputation as a particularly exclusive body.109 The criteria for FATF membership exclude most 
states because members must be ‘strategically important’ both quantitatively in terms of their 
GDP and financial sectors, and qualitatively in terms of their impact on the global financial 
system and their participation in FSRBs.110 The last state to meet these criteria was India in 2010. 
FATF decisions are rolled out to jurisdictions through eight FSRBs in which most, but not all, 
UN member states participate. Since the FATF’s avowed goal is to protect the integrity of the 
financial system, there is no opting-out of the Recommendations, and the FATF applies them to 
states that are not members of FSRBs even though these states have had absolutely no 
opportunity to participate in the standard-setting processes.  
 
Even states that are members of FSRBs lack control over the standard-setting process, when they 
are not also members of the FATF itself. Non-FATF jurisdictions can only participate in FATF 
decision-making processes if their FSRBs meet certain criteria. Even if they do, there is little 
scope for critical voices as FSRBs  
 
‘should endorse the FATF Recommendations and mutual evaluation related material as 
interpreted by the FATF, and support other related FATF material and policies, such as 
best practice papers, guidance, and policy papers’.111  
 
These commitments ensure that the FSRBs channel the various strata of FATF prescriptions 
down to the regional level with the minimum amount of divergence. Given the FATF’s desire to 
eradicate regulatory arbitrage, the FSRBs are less about promoting regional pluralism than 
diminishing its effect on the implementation of the Recommendations. There is a clear pecking-
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order between the FATF and its regional bodies, as reflected in the first principle of High Level 
Agreement that governs relations between them: ‘The FATF is the only standard-setting body 
and the guardian and arbiter of the application of its standard’.112 The two-tier system of 
membership is difficult to square with the principles of global administrative law,113 particularly 
because, at least initially, ‘non-members were voiceless in the process of crafting the FATF 
Recommendations’.114 While the FATF made efforts to consult more widely when the 
Recommendations were revised in 2012, not qualitative changes were made and the revision was 
limited to expanding the existing approach to include new and emerging threats to the integrity 
of the financial system.115  
 
Another factor that diminishes national control over implementation is the technical, rather than 
political, character of its norms. An integral part of the way the FATF normalizes states is 
‘through the dissemination of knowledge-based technologies of Government’.116 National 
control is diminished both by the consequent depoliticization of the norms and by the yen to be 
up-to-date built in to technical knowledge. The FATF prides itself on keeping its 
recommendations up-to-date117 and its prescriptions are subject to continuous updating and 
improvement to keep pace with changes in technology, knowledge and in the practices of money 
launderers and terrorist financiers. In consequence, the process of normalization is open-ended 
because its logic of effectiveness demands that it take account of the latest technical 
developments. The FATF’s ‘typologies’ research continually tweaks the optimal model of 
interpretation in the light of research conducted by experts from FATF member states. This 
research also tends to expand the FATF’s sphere of competence by seeking out ‘new trends or 
methods in misuse of the financial system’.118 As the FATF’s remit grows, so national control of 
implementation diminishes. This effect is exacerbated because the FATF’s reliance on research 
produces a ‘depoliticised expert orthodoxy’.119 Typologies reports are not purely descriptive, and 
feed into the process of drafting prescriptive guidance. For instance, a recent report on the risk of 
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terrorist abuse of non-profit organizations120 will inform the revision of the guidance on 
combatting the abuse of NPOs as required by Recommendation Eight.121 The research-driven 
nature of changes to the FATF’s prescriptions display a logic of effectiveness operating 
according to an underlying assumption that technical knowledge is objective and therefore 
universally applicable. Subsidiarity is side-lined by these prescriptions because such an approach 
to knowledge is blind to any legitimacy issues.  
 
B. Mutual Evaluation Reports 
 
The FATF’s technical, multi-layer prescriptions are given normalizing effect by technologies of 
surveillance. Surveillance is perhaps the most recognizable element of disciplinary power, 
particularly in the form of Bentham’s Panopticon which operated according to a principle of 
‘omni-visibility’.122 Less emblematic, but just as important a tool of surveillance, is the 
examination which ‘transformed the economy of visibility into the exercise of power’.123 The 
examination measures conformity with the prescribed model in order to identify and remedy 
deficiency. The FATF makes extensive use of them in the form of Mutual Evaluation Reports 
(MERs). These reports monitor states’ implementation of the Recommendations on a rolling 
basis in order to identify deficiencies that could jeopardize the integrity of the global financial 
system. MERs are intended to help states to improve their performance by highlighting 
shortcomings and priority areas of action. The evaluation process is iterative and subsequent 
evaluations assess the extent to which a state has made the improvements required as measured 
against the optimal model constituted by the FATF’s technical micro-prescriptions. 
 
All members of the FATF and its FSRBs are subject to MERs conducted according to a 
methodology that measures the effectiveness of implementation as well as basic technical 
compliance with the Recommendations.124 The FATF takes evaluation very seriously and no 
state is immune from findings of non-compliance or ineffectiveness. This reflects the nature of 
the FATF’s project as a universal effort solution to the problems of AML and CTF. For example, 
the USA’s MER for the third round of FATF evaluations in 2006 revealed several shortcomings 
and ends in a lengthy action plan for improvement before the fourth round in 2016. Of the 49 
categories, the US was assessed as ‘compliant’ – meaning that no further work was necessary – 
in only 15 of them. It was found to be ‘non-compliant’ – indicating major shortcomings - in four 
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of them, including in the beneficial ownership of property and the regulation of casinos and other 
non-financial institutions.125 One of the findings of non-compliance related to Recommendations 
Five (on customer due diligence) and 10 (on record keeping) because so-called designated non-
financial business and professions (DNFBPs) such as casinos, accountants, lawyers, dealers in 
precious metals and real estate agents are not subject to sufficient customer identification and 
record-keeping obligations. In its action plan, the US was advised that it should ‘explicitly 
require casinos to perform enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories of customers’ and 
‘extend customer identification, record keeping and account monitoring obligations’ to all other 
DNFBPs.126 Even the US’s national control over implementation is affected by the MERs.  
 
The FATF attempts to covert the action plans into concrete improvements by including a follow-
up process to ensure that states do not simply ignore them0. National control is most extensively 
diminished where a state has failed to progress from the so-called ‘follow-up’ process designed 
to ensure the recommended improvements are made. In this formal follow-up process the 
assessed state reports to the FATF Plenary on the steps it has taken to address its deficiencies. A 
state can only be ‘removed from follow-up’ by submitting a formal application for a finding that 
it is at least ‘largely compliant’.127 As Turkey’ experience illustrates, the process of removal is 
not a mere formality. Instead, states must demonstrate the detailed measures they have taken to 
rectify the deficiency. In October 2014 the FATF published its 15th follow-up report on Turkey’s 
2007 MER.128 The aim of the follow-up process is to raise Turkey’s level of compliance across 
the Recommendations to a status of ‘largely compliant’.  
 
The episode illustrates the tremendous depth the FATF’s corrective process reaches. A sticking 
point in its action plan had been Turkey’s criminalization of terrorist financing as required by 
resolution 1373 and the FATF special recommendation II (2001).129 Turkey had adopted a 
terrorist financing law in order to implement its obligations, but the FATF found it to be 
ineffective and deficient in a number of respects, including in the detailed definition of the actus 
reus and mens rea of the offence and of the sanctions available on conviction. The MER found 
that Turkey’s definition of terrorist funding was too narrow as it only dealt with financial support 
and was concerned that the mental element for the offence, ‘knowing and willing’, was too high 
a threshold. Before it would sign-off on compliance, the FATF required assurances about how 
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elements of the offence would be interpreted by Turkish courts.130 This is an astonishing 
interference with Turkey’s control over the process of implementation and shows that the FATF 
is not satisfied with paper compliance. This makes sense if Turkey is seen as part of a 
decentralized apparatus for regulating the global financial system; its criminal justice system 
must be fit for purpose in practice. Moreover, what counts as fit for purpose is determined by the 




The examination makes it possible to rank individuals and ‘discipline is an art of rank, a 
technique for the transformation of arrangements’.131 The FATF ranks states using shades of 
compliance; not complaint, partially compliant, largely compliant and compliant. In disciplinary 
systems, ranking is transformative and is used to correct deficiency ‘through the mechanics of a 
training’.132 Ranking brings with it ‘a whole micro-economy of privileges and impositions’,133 
which can be seen in the listing practices of the FATF to which we now turn. Ranking supplies 
the FATF’s carrots and sticks and confounds the notion that discipline is a wholly ‘soft power’. 
Although discipline does not enforce its norms in the way that the sovereign enforces the formal 
law, ‘the disciplines established a small ‘infra-penalty’’ to bring the deficient into line.134 
Disciplinary coercions, like disciplinary norms, inhabit the obscured underside of law. As we 
shall see, however, they are also the points at which discipline becomes most visible and, 
therefore, most vulnerable to critique as in the case of the FATF’s practice of ‘blacklisting’ non-
compliant states.  
 
The FATF names and shames non-compliant and non-cooperative jurisdictions,135 with a view to 
mending rents in the fabric of the global financial system. The practice, like all disciplinary 
punishment, is ‘essentially corrective’.136 States failing to show sufficient progress in their 
implementation of the Recommendations are referred to the International Co-operation Review 
Group (ICRG) as ‘high risk and non-cooperative’ jurisdictions. The ICRG process moves from 
the soft corrective training of technical assistance to the hard corrective training of ranking. It is 
notable that ‘non-cooperative’ is a wider category that total failure to engage; it can also apply to 
states which do take the MER follow-up process sufficiently seriously.137 The class of ‘high risk 
and non-cooperative’, like the other ‘shameful’ classes with which Foucault was concerned, 
‘existed only to disappear’.138 It is a permanent classification of a jurisdiction as second-class, it 
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is a spur to improvement. The FATF explained that ‘public identification of countries with 
serious weaknesses in their AML/CFT measures has proven to be a powerful tool for improving 
global compliance’ because ‘it puts pressure on the countries in question to act on and address 
these deficiencies in order to maintain their position in the global economy’.139  
 
The infra-penalty of listing works in several different ways. Firstly, there is a loss of position and 
prestige when a state is ‘named and shamed’ in the ICRG’s bi-annual public statements. At the 
time of writing, the public list contained the names of 24 states, together with brief descriptions 
of their deficiencies.140 Secondly, the list generates incentives to improve because it contains 
several sub-categories reflecting different shades of non-cooperation. At one end are jurisdictions 
subject to a FATF call for counter-measures, and at the other end are jurisdictions no longer 
subject to monitoring. It is equally important for the FATF’s purposes to advertise states’ 
successes as well as their failures. The publication of the lists therefore include something of a 
public ceremony of graduation which records states’ progress through the shades of non-
cooperation and ‘improving compliance’ and, eventually, off the list altogether. Of course, states 
can regress as well as improve and Uganda has recently found itself threatened with being 
demoted from the ‘improver’ category. The ICRG process is an excellent example of ‘this play 
of quantification, this circulation of plus and minus points, [by which] the disciplinary 
apparatuses hierarchized the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subjects in relation to one another’.141  
 
A third aspect of the infra-penalty of listing is the FATF’s practice of calling for counter-
measures as a tangible sanction for non-cooperation. At the time of writing only Iran and North 
Korea are subject to these. States in the sub-category directly above this nadir are also labelled 
with a warning that other states should ‘consider the risks’ arising form their deficiencies. At 
present, the three states on this list – Algeria, Ecuador and Myanmar – are all members of FSRBs 
and have not attempted to opt-out of the system entirely as have Iran and North Korea. All the 
states on the non-cooperative list are affected in a material way because non-cooperative equates 
to a status of ‘high risk’ and potential trading partners are warned that ‘could find that they are 
no longer able to do business with [the listed states] at all’.142 For higher risk jurisdictions, FATF 
Recommendation 19 requires financial institutions ‘to apply enhanced due diligence measures’ 
to entities from ‘higher risk jurisdictions’. According to the interpretive note on this article, these 
measures might involve more stringent reporting requirements, prohibiting the establishment of 
subsidiaries or branches in the country concerned and in general raising the cost of doing 
business so as to dissuade institutions and businesses from making transactions in the higher risk 
jurisdiction.143  
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In sum, the FATF converts its technical prescriptions into measurable behaviour changes using 
mechanisms of surveillance and correction in a way that is characteristic of disciplinary systems. 
In the FATF system, states are deprived of national control over the implementation of their 
obligations while the system, at the same time, emphasizes their responsibility for 
implementation. The FATF’s Recommendations, like the UNSC’s quasi-legislation to which it 
has become attached as infra-law, are the product of a logic of effectiveness that seek to 
transform states into effective nodes of decentralized administration of the global financial 
system. The principle of subsidiarity remains present in the open-textured drafting of the quasi-
legislative provisions and the lack of enforcement mechanisms, but it has no place on the 




In global governance the principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy; responsibility is 
allocated to the national level in order to bring decision-making closer to the human beings it 
affects. Sometimes, as in cases of weakest-link goods like the prevention of transnational 
security challenges, a logic of effectiveness drives the allocation of responsibility to the national 
level. We saw how the UNSC concocted a universal effort solution of decentralized 
administration which strives, however unlikely in the achievement, to completely regulate 
specific aspects of the inter-national space in order to prevent terrorists from operating.  Pursuing 
this project led the Council to lay down a skeletal framework for a common approach to the 
regulation of terrorist financing and the proliferation of CBN material and its means of delivery. 
Concerns about the legitimacy of this ‘quasi-legislation’ given the UNSC’s democracy deficit 
meant that it has had to find ways of ensuring that states implement their obligations without 
counter-productively alienating or angering them. The logic of effectiveness underlying the 
Council’s project is echoed by the logic of effectiveness underpinning disciplinary power. Along 
with discipline’s under-the-radar modus operandi, the shared logic has rendered discipline an 
ideal instrument of implementation. The problem is that discipline operates on the underside of 
law and seeks to immunize itself from critical scrutiny and challenge. The retention of the 
principle of subsidiarity on the surface of the quasi-legislation only tends to entrench this 
situation. In effect, discipline seeks to ensure national responsibility without national-control, 
effectively side-lining the principle of subsidiarity. 
